31 Free Will Arguments
Arnold van der Nat, Fall, 2005
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Here are 31 arguments on the question of whether or not people have free will. All of these arguments have been formulated in such a way that the conclusion follows easily from the premisses by obvious laws of logic. So, the correctness of each of these argument reduces to the correctness of their premisses. For any of these arguments, if all the premisses can be demonstrated to be true, then the conclusion of the argument, that people have free will, or that people don't have free will, as the case of the argument may be, will likewise have been demonstrated to be true.
One can observe right away that all of the arguments presented below are plausible arguments, because, in each case, all of the premisses themselves are plausible. But being plausible is not enough, since premisses can be both plausible and false. Rather, the premisses must be true, and anything less than a demonstration of their truth will leave the question of free will unresolved.
The arguments we present here, while they are all plausible, cannot all be correct, since they argue for two opposite conclusions. One of the two sides is the correct one. But which one? It will be seen that some arguments start with false premisses. So, those arguments must be dismissed. And some arguments commit the fallacy of Begging the Question, and they too must be dismissed. On the other hand, some of the arguments have premisses whose truth or falsehood is difficult to determine. These are weak arguments, but they are not nothing. The frustating arguments are ones where it is clear that the premisses are true, but it is difficult to demonstrate that they are, and absent such demonstration, the problem of free will remains unresolved. One may hope that some of these arguments have premisses that can be demonstrated to be true. Those arguments would then settle the matter once and for all.
In this discussion, we distinguish freedom of action from freedom of choice, and we use the following definitions:
An action A is a free action of a person X =def. (1) X chose to do A, (2) X's choice caused A to occur, and (3) X's choice was a free choice.
X's choice to do A was a free choice =def. (1) X chose to do A, and (2) there was no cause that caused X to choose to do A; that is, right up to the moment that X chose to do A, it was actually possible, even given the circumstance that X was in, that X would choose not to do A.
We present now the various arguments for and against free will.
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Argument #1 (from experience)
| P1. | I experience my choice as being free. |
| P2. | If I experience my choice as being free, then my choice really is free. |
| C1. | So, my choice really is free. |
Argument #2 (from illusion)
| P1. | The experience of free will is no more than an appearance. |
| P2. | If the experience of free will is no more than an appearance, then people don't really have free will. |
| C1. | So, people don't really have free will. |
Argument #3 (from moral responsibility)
| P1. | If people don't have free will, then they are not morally responsible for their actions. |
| P2. | But, people are morally responsible for their actions. |
| C1. | So, people do have free will. |
Argument #4 (from appropriate emotions)
| P1. | If people don't have free will, then all human emotions (such as love, or compassion) are inappropriate. |
| P2. | But, at least some cases of human emotion are appropriate. |
| C1. | So, people do have free will. |
Argument #5 (from randomness)
| P1. | If a choice is free, then it is not caused. |
| P2. | If a choice is not caused, then it is a random occurrence. |
| P3. | But, if a choice is free, then it is not a random occurrence. |
| C1. | So, if a choice is free, then it is both a random occurrence and not a random occurrence, which is impossible. |
| C2. | So, no choice can be free. |
Argument #6 (from indeterminism)
| P1. | That people have free will is a very plausible position. |
| P2. | The only reason to reject free will is that science has advocated total determinism. |
| P3. | Science now no longer advocates total determinism. |
| C1. | So, there is now no longer any reason to reject free will. |
| P4. | If there is no reason to reject an otherwise very plausible position, then one should accept that position as true. |
| C2. | So, one should accept the position that people have free will. |
Argument #7 (from human works)
| P1. | The works of human beings are unlike anything produced by nature working under natural law. |
| P2. | The only possible explanation for this observed fact is the hypothesis that people have free will (among other qualities such as creativity, vision, understanding, purpose). |
| P3. | If a given hypothesis is the only possible explanation for an observed fact, then that hypothesis is true. |
| C1. | So, it is true that people have free will. |
Argument #8 (from worry)
| P1. | If I am able to worry about whether I have free will, then I have to have free will. |
| P2. | I am able to worry about whether I have free will. |
| C1. | So, I have free will. |
Argument #9 (from agency)
| P1. | If I do not have free will, then I am not an agent (a self). |
| P2. | But, I am an agent (a self). |
| C1. | So, I do have free will. |
Argument #10 (against an "open future")
| P1. | Whatever future events will happen, it is now true that these future events will happen as they do. (E.g., if I will in fact sing tomorrow, then it is true, and it is true now, that I will sing tomorrow.) |
| P2. | If it is now true that these future events will happen as they do, then it is now not possible for anyone to bring it about that any of these future events will not happen. (E.g., if it is now true that I will sing tomorrow, then it is now not possible for me to bring it about that I will not sing tomorrow.) |
| P3. | If it is now not possible for anyone to bring it about that any of these future events will not happen, then people are not free with respect to any future events. |
| C1. | So, people are not free with respect to any future events. |
Argument #11 (from God's omniscience)
| P1. | If God knows everything, then God knows now what future events will happen. |
| P2. | If God knows now what future events will happen, then it is now not possible for anyone to bring it about that any of these future events will not happen. |
| P3. | If it is now not possible for anyone to bring it about that any of these future events will not happen, then people are not free with respect to any future events. |
| C1. | So, if God knows everything, then people are not free with respect to any future event. |
Argument #12 (from God's complete governance)
| P1. | If God governs everything, then God causes everything to happen. |
| P2. | If God causes everything to happen, then people are not free in any of their actions. |
| C1. | So, if God governs everything, then people are not free in any of their actions. |
Argument #13 (from God's selective governance)
| P1. | If God governs everything, then God selectively causes some things to happen. |
| P2. | If God selectively causes some things to happen, then people are not free with respect to those events. |
| C1. | So, if God governs everything, then people are not free with respect to those events that God causes. |
Argument #14 (from universal belief in moral responsibility)
| P1. | We all believe that people are morally responsible for their actions (MRA). |
| P2. | If we all believe that people are MRA, then it is really true that people are MRA. |
| P3. | If it is really true that people are MRA, then people have free will. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #15 (from innate belief in moral responsibility)
| P1. | We all believe that people are morally responsible for their actions. |
| P2. | If we all believe that people are MRA, then we innately believe that people are MRA. |
| P3. | If we innately believe that people are MRA, then it is really true that people are MRA. |
| P4. | If it is really true that people are MRA, then people have free will. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #16 (from creative acts)
| P1. | Some processes are creative in the sense that are they are strictly controlled by their performer to achieve a highly unnatural arrangement of effects that nature does not produce without such special control, (e.g., hanging picture on the wall, writing a sentence, preparing a meal, singing a song, etc.). |
| P2. | Such special control requires that the performer has free will. |
| P3. | People all engage in such creative processes. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #17 (against magic)
| P1. | All proposals of people acting with free will are proposals of events occurring without the possibility of scientific explanation, (e.g., someone's freely choosing to drink a cup of coffee is a case of the cup being moved from table to mouth without the possibility of scientific explanation). |
| P2. | All proposals of events occurring without the possibility of scientific explanation are proposals similar to proposals of magic. |
| P3. | All proposals similar to proposals of magic must be rejected by the scientific view of things. |
| C1. | So, all proposals of people acting with free will must be rejected by the scientific view of things. |
| P4. | And, the scientific view of things is correct. |
| C2. | So, all proposals of people acting with free will are wrong. |
Argument #18 (in favor of magic)
| P1. | All proposals of people acting with free will are proposals of events occurring without the possibility of scientific explanation. (E.g., someone's freely choosing to drink a cup of coffee is a case of the cup being moved from table to mouth without the possibility of scientific explanation). |
| P2. | All proposals of events occurring without the possibility of scientific explanation are proposals similar to proposals of magic. |
| P3. | All proposals similar to proposals of magic must be rejected by the scientific view of things. |
| C1. | So, all proposals of people acting with free will must be rejected by the scientific view of things. |
| P4. | But, proposals of people acting with free will seem perfectly reasonable and correct. |
| C2. | So, the scientific view of things is wrong (about some matters). |
Argument #19 (from communication)
| P1. | If people do not have free will, then they cannot engage in purposive conversations. |
| P2. | But, people do engage in purposive conversations. |
| C1. | So, people do have free will. |
Argument #20 (from computer mimicry)
| P1. | Computers can perform every task that people can perform. |
| P2. | Computers do not have free will. |
| C1. | So, no task that people can perform requires that people have free will. |
| P3. | If no human activity requires free will, then we have no reason to believe that people have free will. |
| P4. | If we have no reason to believe that people have free will, then we should not believe that people have free will. |
| C2. | So, we should not believe that people have free will. |
Argument #21 (from computer incompetence)
| P1. | People can perform a great many tasks by themselves, in particular, those that require purposive behavior. |
| P2. | Computers cannot perform these tasks by themselves. |
| P3. | The reason why computers cannot perform these tasks by themselves is that such tasks require the performer to have free will, and computers do not have free will. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #22 (from total causality)
| P1. | Things made only of matter can only have actions that are caused. |
| P2. | Things that can only have actions that are caused do not have free will. |
| C1. | So, things made only of matter do not have free will. |
| C2. | So, if people are made only of matter, then people do not have free will. |
Argument #23 (from causality and randomness)
| P1. | Things made only of matter can only have actions that either are caused or are random. |
| P2. | Things that can only have actions that either are caused or are random do not have free will. |
| C1. | So, things made only of matter do not have free will. |
| C2. | So, if people are made only of matter , then people do not have free will. |
Argument #24 (from the required alternative)
| P1. | People perform some actions that are neither caused nor random. |
| P2. | If a person performs an action, and the action is not caused, and it is not random, then the only remaining alternative is that the action arises from an exercise of free will. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #25 (from anti-materialism)
| P1. | Things made only of matter can only have actions that either are caused or are random. |
| P2. | People perform some actions that are neither caused nor random. |
| C1. | So, people are not things made only of matter, that is, they are more than matter. |
| P3. | If people are more than matter, and they perform actions that are neither caused nor random, then people have free will. |
| C2. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #26 (from deliberation)
| P1. | All people often engage in deliberation about what actions they should take. |
| P2. | If the actions that people take are never the result of an exercise of free will, then such deliberation about what actions to take is a completely pointless activity. |
| P3. | But, nature does not allow for completely pointless activities that all people often engage in. |
| C1. | So, it is false that the actions that people take are never the result of an exercise of free will. |
| C2. | So, some actions that some people take are the result of an exercise of free will. |
Argument #27 (from cellular composition)
| P1. | The entire human body (including the brain) is made up of cells each of which has no freedom of choice. |
| P2. | If the entire human body (including the brain) is made up of cells each of which has no freedom of choice, then a human being cannot have freedom of choice. |
| C1. | So, a human being cannot have freedom of choice. |
Argument #28 (from diversity of human actions)
| P1. | If people did not have free will, then there would not be such a wide variety of outcomes in the actions that people take. (Think of ants.) |
| P2. | But, there is indeed such a wide variety of outcomes in the actions that people take. |
| C1. | So, people do have free will. |
Argument #29 (from avoidance of expected causal outcomes)
| P1. | People have an ability to make choices that are contrary to expected causal outcomes. |
| P2. | This ability requires free will. |
| C1. | So, people have free will. |
Argument #30 (from missing causal factors)
| P1. | If there is no free will, then all our choices are caused by special factors occurring in and around us. |
| P2. | But people sometimes make choices when they have leisure, no responsibility, no social pressure, and so on, in short, when there are no apparent special factors occurring in and around them that cause those choices. |
| C1. | So, it is false that people have no free will. |
Argument #31 (from equal options)
| P1. | People sometimes make choices between two options that are equal in all respects. |
| P2. | But such choices cannot have a cause. |
| C1. | So, such choices must be free. |